Читать онлайн «The Logic of Political Survival»
Автор Брюс Буэно де Мескита
Table of Contents
I - A THEORY OF POLITICAL INCENTIVES
Chapter 1 - Reining in the Prince
Three Puzzles
The Essence of the Argument
Organization of the Investigation
A Theory of Political Incentives: Part I
Policy Choice and Political Survival: Part II
Choosing Institutions for Political Selection: Part III
Why Focus on Political Survival?
Threats to Political Survival
Challenges to Political Survival
Easy Answers, Inadequate Answers
An Incomplete Theory of Institutional Political Laws
Chapter 2 - The Theory: Definitions and Intuition
The Elements of the Polity
The Selectorate (S)
The Winning Coalition (W)
Illustrative Examples of Small, Restrictive Winning Coalitions
Sources of Risks and Rewards
The Challenger’s Commitment Problem
Affinity
The Replacement or Deposition Rule
Political Systems: Analogies But Not Equivalence
What Is Missing from Our Theory
Conclusion
Chapter 3 - A Model of the Selectorate Theory
Economic Activity, Policy Provision, and Payoffs
Equilibria of the Selectorate Model
Alternative Equilibrium
How Institutions Structure Incentives
Further Implications
Bridging from Theory to Testable Hypotheses
Conclusion
Appendix
II - POLICY CHOICE AND POLITICAL SURVIVAL
Chapter 4 - Institutions for Kleptocracy or Growth
Measurement Issues
Institutional Variables
Measurement of Labor, Leisure, and Taxes
Evidence: Labor or Leisure
Evidence: Taxation
Economic Growth
Government Expenditures, Expenditures Per Capita, and Opportunities for Kleptocracy
Conclusion
Chapter 5 - Institutions, Peace, and Prosperity
The Shift from Public to Private Goods in Sparta
Empirical Assessments: Core Public Goods
General Public Goods
Public-Goods Summary
Empirical Assessment of the Provision of Private Goods
Montesquieu, Madison, Population, and Public Welfare
Leopold II: An Illustration
Conclusion
Chapter 6 - War, Peace, and Coalition Size
The Democratic Peace
The Debate
The Dyadic Selectorate Model
Structure of the Dyadic Selectorate Game
Solving the Game
The Decision to Fight or to Negotiate
The Selectorate Peace: Interaction of Polities
Diversionary War and Compromise Agreements
Empirical Assessments
Conclusion
Appendix
Chapter 7 - Political Survival
Survival as Explained by the Selectorate Theory
Mamluk Egypt
Empirical Assessment of Political Survival
Extrapolitical Risks of Deposition
A Tale of Two Countries
Conclusion
III - CHOOSING INSTITUTIONS
Chapter 8 - Institutional Preferences: Change from Within
The Selectorate Theory and Institutional Preferences
Oppression
Political Actions to Alter Institutions
Population Migration: The Disenfranchised and the Selectorate
Protest, Civil War, and Revolution
Purges and Coups d’état: Actions by Coalition Members
Actions by Leaders: Constructing Autocracy
Conclusion
Chapter 9 - The Enemy Outside and Within: War and Changes of Leaders and Regimes
Selection Institutions and War Aims
The Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran
Testing the War-Aims Argument
Leadership Removal
War and Domestic Change
Nation Building After Disputes
Franco, Mussolini, and the Enemy Within
Conclusion
